Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 42

Issue 1

Article 3

April 1965

Constitutional Law - Due Process of Law - Fifth Amendment
Privilege against Selp-Incrimination Protected by Fourtenth
Amendment against Abridgement by the States
T.F. Lysaught

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
T.F. Lysaught, Constitutional Law - Due Process of Law - Fifth Amendment Privilege against SelpIncrimination Protected by Fourtenth Amendment against Abridgement by the States, 42 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
54 (1965).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol42/iss1/3

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-DUE

PROCESS

OF

LAW-FIFTH

AMENDMENT

PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION PROTECTED BY FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AGAINST ABRIDGEMENT BY THE STATES-In

the recent case of Malloy

v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489 (1964), the United States Supreme

Court was confronted with the question of whether the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination was available to a witness in a state
proceeding. The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did guarantee
a witness in a state proceeding the protection of the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination.
In the case under discussion, the defendant, Malloy, was arrested by
Hartford, Connecticut police and at that time pleaded guilty to the crime
of gambling. After serving a reduced sentence, he was called to testify
before a state inquiry into gambling and other criminal activities in the
Hartford area. At that inquiry, he declined to answer a number of questions relating to the events surrounding his arrest and conviction. His refusal was based on the ground that such disclosure would tend to incriminate him. The Superior Court of Hartford County held Malloy in contempt
and sent him to prison until he was willing to answer the questions asked of
him at the inquiry. Malloy applied for a writ of habeas corpus, but his
application was denied by the Superior Court. The Connecticut Supreme
Court of Errors affirmed the denial of the writ,' holding that neither the
Fifth Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment extended to Malloy the
right to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in
a state proceeding and that, in addition, Malloy had not properly invoked
the privilege available to him under the Connecticut Constitution. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory self-incrimination was protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by the States and that
Malloy had properly invoked the privilege.
The present day concept of the privilege against self-incrimination
had its beginnings in the early days of the common law. In those times the
courts, and particularly the infamous Star Chamber, were invested with
the power to compel confessions from accused persons, and torture was not
infrequently applied.2 In addition, an oath, called the oath ex officio, was
widely employed. Those who took the oath swore to tell the whole truth in
answer to questions put to them; but a refusal to take the oath or to answer
under it was taken as confession of the offense charged. 3
In the early- seventeenth century, the common law courts began to
1 Malloy v. Hogan, 150 Conn. 220, 187 A.2d 744 (1963).

2 Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of The Self-Incrimination Clause, 29
Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1930); Stevens, Sources of the Constitution of the United States 230
(2d ed. 1927).

3 Corwin, supra note 2.
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recognize that the common law process in England was accusatorial and
not inquisitorial. 4 In addition, the people grew increasingly dissatisfied
with the abuses associated with the oath ex officio. 5 These developments
combined to force the abolition of the oath and a cessation of the coercive
methods associated with obtaining confessions. 6 By 1688, "the privilege
against self-incrimination became so well established as a part of the
[English] common law that it was not thought necessary to incorporate it
in the English Bill of Rights of 1689."7
The English colonists who came to America in pre-revolutionary times
brought with them the fear of an inquisitorial system of criminal jurisprudence and also a lingering remembrance of the abuses associated with
coerced self-incrimination. 8 Their fears and reservations found expression
in the early state constitutions in the form of restrictions on the power of
the state to compel incriminatory statements from its citizens. 9 It was within
this historical framework and environment that the framers of the Bill of
Rights specified in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
that, "No person . . .shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness

against himself ....

" The prohibition was clear.

There is found little reference to the privilege against self-incrimination in the early federal court cases. 10 However, during the latter half of
the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth century, the
privilege was held to extend to witnesses as well as party defendants and
to civil as well as criminal proceedings, "wherever the answer might tend
to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it.""
Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the question of
whether the Fifth Amendment privilege was available to parties in a state
proceeding was decided by inference when the United States Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Barron v. Baltimore.12 In that case,
the plaintiff contended that his property had been taken for public use by
an instrumentality of the state and that compensation was therefore re4 Moreland, Historical Background and Implications of the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination,44 Ky. L.J. 267 (1958).
5 Ibid.
6 Corwin, supra note 2.
7 Moreland, supra note 4, at 272.
8 Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination in America, 21 Va. L. Rev. 763 (1935).
9 See, e.g., Constitution of Virginia 1776-Bill of Rights § 8: "That in all capital or
criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his
accusation ... nor can he be compelled to give evidence against himself ......
10 Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of The Self-Incrimination Clause, 29
Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1930).
11 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40, 45 Sup. Ct. 16, 17 (1924). For other cases
applying and extending the privilege, see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct.
524 (1886); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 12 Sup. Ct. 195 (1892); Empsak v.
United States, 349 U.S. 190, 75 Sup. Ct. 689 (1955).
12 7 Pet. 243, 8 L. Ed. 672 (1833).
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quired to be paid in accordance with the Fifth Amendment. 3 The Court
held, however, that the Fifth Amendment must be understood as restraining
the power of the federal government only, and not applicable to the states.
It follows, therefore, that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination is not available to parties in a state proceeding by operation
of the Fifth Amendment alone.
Subsequent to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the question
again arose in the case of Twining v. New Jersey.14 In Twining, the defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor in a state criminal proceeding. The
trial court charged the jury that it could draw inferences unfavorable to
the defendant because of his failure to take the witness stand. Twining
appealed, contending that the charge violated the privilege against selfincrimination, and consequently abridged his privileges and immunities
as a citizen of the United States and denied him due process of law. The
Court held that the exception from compulsory self-incrimination was not
a privilege or immunity of national citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment nor was it protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process clause. The Court, in so holding, said:
[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by
the first eight amendments against national action may also be
safeguarded against state action because a denial of them would
be a denial of due process of law.' 5
However, in regard to the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court
stated:
There seems to be no reason whatever, for straining the meaning
of due process of law to include this privilege within it, because
perhaps we may think it of great value. The states had guarded the
privilege to the satisfaction of their own people up to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. No reason is perceived why
they cannot continue to do so.16
The same theme was echoed forty years later in Adamson v. California.17 Adamson was tried and convicted for murder in the first degree. On
appeal, he contended that certain provisions of the California Constitutionl8 and California Penal Code, 19 which permitted comment upon his
13 [N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. Const., amend. V.
14 211 U.S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14 (1908).
15 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 19 (1908).
16 Id. at 113, 29 Sup. Ct. at 26.
17 332 U.S. 46, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672 (1947).
18 "No person shall . .. be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . . but in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure
to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may
be commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or
jury." Calif. Const. art. I, § 13.
19 "The failure of the defendant to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence
or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by counsel." Calif. Penal Code

§ 1323.
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failure to testify, were invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. In affirming the conviction, the Court cited the Twining decision and observed that
the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
was not protected against state action "on the ground that freedom from
testimonial compulsion is a right of national citizenship, or because it is
a personal privilege or immunity secured by the Federal Constitution as
one of the rights of men that are listed in the Bill of Rights." 20 The Court
further observed that:
The Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause does not protect
. . . the accused's freedom from giving testimony by compulsion
in state trials that is secured
to him against federal interference by
21
the Fifth Amendment.
It was clearly indicated in Adamson, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids compulsion to testify by fear of hurt, torture, exhaustion or
any other type of coercion that falls within the scope of due process.
In the principal case, Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court,22
stated that, "the Court has not hesitated to re-examine past decisions
according the Fourteenth Amendment a less central role in the preservation of basic liberties than that which was contemplated by its framers
when they added the Amendment to our constitutional scheme." 23 He
further pointed out that since the decisions in Twining and Adamson,
the Court has tended to depart from the view expressed in those cases. This
departure, it was suggested, reflected a recognition that, "the American
system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial not inquisitorial, and that
'24
the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay.
The majority opinion further reasoned that since the American system
of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, then both state and federal governments are constitutionally required to "establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge
against an accused out of his own mouth." 25 The Court, while expressly
reaffirming the prevailing view that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
incorporate the first eight, concluded that:
The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the
same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against
federal infringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless
he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will,
and to suffer no penalty, as held in Twining, for such silence. 26
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 51, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672, 1675 (1947).
Id. at 54, 67 Sup Ct. at 1676. For similar statements, see Cohen v. Hurley, 336 U.S.
117,81 Sup. Ct. 954 (1961); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 54 Sup. Ct. 330 (1934).
22 In the 5-4 decision, Justices Harlan, White, Clark and Stewart dissented.
23 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 5, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489, 1492 (1964).
24 Id. at 7, 84 Sup. Ct. at 1493.
25 Id. at 8, 84 Sup. Ct. at 1493.
26 Ibid.
20
21
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It was contended, however, that the availability of the federal privilege to a witness in a state proceeding should be ascertained by reference
to a less stringent standard than is applicable in a federal proceeding. The
Court disagreed, pointing out that it would be "incongruous to have different standards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the
same feared prosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted
in a state or federal court" 27 and that "the same standards must determine
whether an accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding is
28
justified."
A vigorous dissenting opinion was written by Mr. Justice Harlan, who
felt that the question presented in the Malloy case was not whether a
specific provision of one of the first eight Amendments was violated, but
whether there was a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. He reasoned that what the Fourteenth Amendment requires of the
states does not basically depend on what the first eight amendments require
of the federal government, and therefore, the majority's holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment secures against invasion the same privilege that
the Fifth Amendment secures against federal invasion, is unnecessary and
inappropriate. He objected to incorporation of the first eight amendments
into the Fourteenth by "snaches," and stated:
If, however, the Due Process Clause is something more than a
reference to the Bill of Rights and protects only those rights which
derive from fundamental principles, as the majority purports to
believe, it is just as contrary to precedent and just as illogical to
incorporate the provisions of the Bill of Rights one at a time as it
is to incorporate them all at once.29
In summary, the United States Supreme Court has once again added
to the ever expanding scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. The Malloy decision clearly indicates that the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is available to both defendants and witnesses in state proceedings, and that the federal standard
will be employed to determine whether the privilege is properly invoked.
Noteworthy is the prophetic observation made 56 years ago by Mr. Justice
Harlan in his dissent in the Twining case. He stated:
I cannot support any judgment declaring that immunity from selfincrimination is not . . . a part of the liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment against hostile state action .... And the
Court having heretofore, upon the fullest consideration, declared
that the compelling of a citizen of the United States, charged with
crime, to be a witness against himself, was a rule abhorrent to the
instincts of Americans, was in violation of universal American law,
was contrary to the principles of free government, and a weapon
of despotic power which could not abide the pure atmosphere of
27 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964).
28 Ibid.
29 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 27, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489, 1504 (1964).
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political liberty and personal freedom, I cannot agree that a state
may make that rule a part of its law and binding on citizens,
despite the Constitution of the United States. 0
T.F. LYSAUGHT

WITNESSES-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION-FEDERAL OFFICIALS BARRED FROM USING TESTIMONY ELICITED UNDER STATE IMMUNITY

STATUTE-The United States Supreme Court, in the recent case of Murphy

v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 Sup. Ct.
1594 (1964), was confronted with the problem of whether a state could
compel a witness, who had been given immunity from prosecution under its
laws, to give testimony which might be used to convict him of a federal
crime. The Court overruled its prior decisions' by holding that compelled
testimony and its fruits, elicited under a state immunity statute, may not be
used in any manner by federal officials in a criminal prosecution against the
witness.
This case must be considered in conjunction with the case of Malloy v.
Hogan,2 decided the same day, which held that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination was fully applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment "due process clause" and that the state
standard must be the same as the federal standard in determining whether
a witness is justified in refusing to answer on the grounds that it might tend
to incriminate him.
In the Murphys case, the petitioners were subpoenaed by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor to testify in regard to a work
stoppage at certain piers located in New Jersey. The petitioners were
80

Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 126-27, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 31 (1908).

1 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 52 Sup. Ct. 63 (1941); Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487, 64 Sup. Ct. 1082 (1944); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 78 Sup.
Ct. 1302 (1958).
2 378 U.S. 1, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489 (1964). Malloy had been arrested for the crime of pool
selling, and after pleading guilty had served 90 days in jail. Sixteen months after his plea
of guilty, he was subpoenaed to testify at an inquiry into alleged gambling and other
criminal activities in Hartford County, Connecticut. Malloy refused to answer questions
designed to ascertain for whom he worked when arrested for pool selling. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors had held that the Fifth Amendment was not applicable
to the States and that Malloy was not justified in refusing to answer because of the
defenses of double jeopardy and the running of the one year statute of limitations on
misdemeanors (pool selling), so that his answers could not possibly subject him to prosecution under any state law. Malloy v. Hogan, 150 Conn. 220, 187 A.2d 744 (1963). The
United States Supreme Court reversed holding that Malloy could invoke the Fifth
Amendment in a state proceeding and refuse to answer because to answer might subject
him to federal prosecution and that the disclosure of the name of the man for whom
he worked might furnish a link in a chain of evidence which might connect him with
a more recent crime for which he might be prosecuted.
3 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 Sup. Ct.
1594 (1964).

